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9.1 
Introduction
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is, as its name implies, characterized by
obsessions (i.e., recurrent thoughts or images, particularly ones that cause distress)
as well as compulsions (i.e., urges to perform mental or physical acts repeatedly),
both of which significantly impair everyday functioning [1]. Obsessions are consid-
ered to be recurrent distressing impressions that something is wrong with an action
or with a situation, such as an error or an imminent danger [2–4]. Compulsions are
generally conceptualized as aiming to prevent feared harmful events and are thus
associated with an increased sense of responsibility [5, 6]. However, they may also
be motivated by particular sensory experiences concerning actions, such as feelings
of incompleteness, that trigger the need to adjust them, rather than the avoidance of
potential harm [7]. 
Both the sense of responsibility and the feeling of incompleteness can be viewed
as experiences of actions that are obviously in conflict with the actual action context.
Specifically, compulsions can be seen as behavioral responses to recurrent feelings
of dissatisfaction regarding an intended achievement. Moreover, OCD features have
been consistently connected to deficits affecting action processing, such as action
planning [8, 9] and action monitoring [10, 11]. 
Research on the sense of agency has highlighted the importance of action speci-
fication (e.g., outcome anticipation) and action monitoring (e.g., assessing the
degree of concordance between anticipated and actual outcomes) in the subjective
understanding of “what one is doing” and “what one is causing” [12–17]. Hence, a
dysfunction affecting these components of action processing could lead to an incon-
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sistent appraisal of one’s actions and of the surrounding environment. More impor-
tantly, recent models of sense of agency suggest that there are various levels of action
specification and monitoring (e.g., sensorimotor, perceptual, and conceptual levels);
each level may contribute to a specific component of the sense of agency [14, 18].
Therefore, the nature of the impairment and the level at which the dysfunction
applies may underlie specific patterns of a defective sense of agency. 
In this chapter, we review the phenomenology of OCD to understand how its het-
erogeneity can be depicted as an outcome processing issue and how it can be differ-
entially affected across distinct OCD profiles. 
9.2 
The Clinical Features and Phenomenology of OCD 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder is commonly viewed as a set of maladaptive habits
and ways of thinking, of which obsessions and compulsions are the most prominent
symptoms. As in other psychopathological states, OCD symptoms are present to
some degree in most people; their frequency and their impact on everyday function-
ing may distinguish non-clinical from clinical cases of OCD [19]. Obsessions involve
intrusive thoughts, images, or impulses that cause significant distress. Common
obsessions include preoccupation with contamination, concerns about potential
threatening outcomes, fear of harming oneself or others, repeated doubts about self-
action, and preoccupation with action satisfaction. Over 90% of patients with OCD
report performing compulsive behaviors to reduce the distress associated with obses-
sions [20]. Compulsions refer to the need to perform mental or physical acts in a
repeated or stereotyped way. Repetitive checking (e.g., checking locks, lights, and
appliances) and repetitive washing (e.g., hand washing, house cleaning) are the most
common compulsions [21, 22]. 
An important feature of OCD is that some behaviors and activities that are per-
formed automatically by most people (e.g., washing one’s hands, locking a door,
tidying up clothes) are related to a dysfunctional experience of action. Examples
include an inflated sense of responsibility for the occurrence or avoidance of bad out-
comes, beliefs that one’s thoughts can have direct negative consequences for the
external world, beliefs that errors can have harmful consequences, an exaggeration of
the probability and severity of potential harm, inconsistent impressions of failure or
feelings of imperfection, feelings that actions or intentions have been incompletely
executed, and an undermined sense of goal satisfaction. These inconsistent feelings
and beliefs form strong motivational features concerning the occurrence of OCD
symptoms. They can be classified according to the extent to which OCD symptoms
are predominantly characterized by feelings of responsibility or of incompleteness. 
Responsibility in OCD refers to the “belief that one has power which is pivotal to
bring about or prevent subjectively crucial negative outcomes” ([23], p. 111). This
OCD dimension seems to be dominated by cognitive phenomena, including dysfunc-
tional beliefs, biased inferences and judgments, misinterpretation of intrusive
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thoughts. One important feature of this phenomenon is the premonitory aspect of neg-
ative outcomes. Indeed, OCD individuals experience the content of certain intrusive
thoughts as an indication of a future negative consequence of their action or inaction.
They may also voluntarily try to foresee a wide range of negative consequences of
their actions. In addition, the processing of anticipated negative outcomes is influ-
enced by dysfunctional beliefs, such as the idea that doing nothing about potentially
upcoming bad events is equivalent to causing disastrous outcomes. Overall, these fea-
tures lead OCD individuals to experience feelings of responsibility and guilt and com-
pel them to undertake preventive actions (i.e., avoidance strategies). 
On the other hand, incompleteness and “not just right” feelings are dominated by
sensory phenomena and are described by patients as impressions of failure or feel-
ings of imperfection. Such feelings can lead to an inability to achieve a sense of “task
completion” or “closure” regarding actions (e.g., locking the door) or perceptions
(e.g., objects on a table). This sense of dissatisfaction may cause people to experi-
ence inconsistent feelings that “actions or intentions have been incompletely
achieved” ([24], p. 80). It may also lead them to feel only a weak sense of goal sat-
isfaction. Repeated compulsions may then be motivated by the need to alleviate feel-
ings of incompleteness or to feel “just right” [25]. 
Although these two distinct motivational core features may be more fundamental
than mere symptom clusters, their prevalence seems to vary across the different OCD
subtypes. Indeed, harm avoidance may particularly be reflected in washing and
obsessing symptoms [26]. Incompleteness, on the other hand, may be especially asso-
ciated with checking [26, 27] and ordering [26, 28]. Furthermore, distinct neural cor-
relates have been associated with these different OCD subtypes. For example, check-
ing symptoms, which are frequently related to incompleteness, may be connected to
increased activity in brain regions involved with motor processing, such as dorsolat-
eral prefrontal regions, putamen/globus pallidus, and brainstem nuclei [29–31].
Washing symptoms, which are related to harm avoidance, have been found to be
associated with increased activity in brain regions that process emotional aspects of
information (e.g., orbitofrontal regions [29, 31]).
Overactive performance monitoring, as reflected by the anterior cingulate cortex
hyperactivity and electrophysiological abnormalities observed in OCD, has consis-
tently been connected to incompleteness features [11, 32-34]. It is assumed to reflect
excessive error detection, caused by an impaired comparison between actual and
expected responses [35, 36]. Indeed, an internal comparator mechanism may com-
pare the internal representation of action and the resulting action. If a conflict is
detected, the system triggers a signal and adjustment behavior is activated. It has
been suggested that a hyperactive error signal in OCD arises from a dysfunction in a
comparator mechanism, which then erroneously detects a mismatch between repre-
sentations of the actual and the intended response. 
On the other hand, responsibility features seem to be associated with increased
activity in brain regions that process the emotional aspects of action, such as the
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). The OFC may play an important role in action control
and guidance of behaviors, through outcome representations and particularly by
anticipating the affective impact of outcomes. This form of anticipation plays an
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important role in decision-making [37]. The representation of anticipated outcomes
may depend on how the OFC generates possible alternative outcomes of one’s action.
Moreover, lateral areas of the OFC may underlie the anticipation of potential nega-
tive outcomes, while areas from the ventral and medial prefrontal cortex may be
specifically involved in representing the impact of outcomes with a positive valence
[38, 39]. Increased activity in the lateral OFC in OCD individuals has been consis-
tently related to their concerns with potential future negative outcomes [40]. 
Taken together, the above-mentioned studies suggest that OCD symptoms are
related either to an impaired ability to re-integrate generated outcomes as being con-
sistent with intended outcomes, or to an increased processing of outcomes, particu-
larly of their emotional value at an early stage of action specification. From this per-
spective, compulsions can be conceptualized as behavioral strategies aimed at either
generating outcomes that match the intended ones, as is the case in incompleteness
phenomena, or avoiding the occurrence of potential negative consequences.
To sum up, people with OCD may experience a sense of responsibility for threat-
ening events whose occurrence are not related to their actions. Yet, these individuals
feel compelled to deploy compulsions in order to counter bad outcomes. Other OCD
individuals, however, may perform compulsive behaviors because they have inconsis-
tent feelings that an action has not been satisfactorily completed or that their goals
and intentions have not been achieved. Compulsive behaviors related to incomplete-
ness phenomena have the purpose of generating outcomes that will provide a sense
of task completion. Furthermore, the phenomenal state preceding compulsions can
be related either to “feelings of undesired end-state being achieved” or to “feelings
of desired end-state being unachieved.” The former may trigger avoidance strategies
while the latter may trigger adjustment behaviors. 
In both cases, dysfunctional outcome processing seems to be implicated in the
inconsistent experience of action. For example, neurobiological studies indirectly
suggest that incompleteness phenomena are related to an impaired ability to perceive
generated outcomes as being consistent with their internal representations; whereas
harm avoidance and responsibility may be related to an increased focus on potential
negative outcomes of action. Nevertheless, outcome processing plays an important
role in the experience of action, especially the mechanism that compares events
appearing upstream from action (i.e., outcome anticipation) with those occurring
downstream (i.e., generated outcomes) [12-17]. Hence, theories concerning sense of
agency offer a reliable context to understand the dysfunctional construal of self-
action in OCD. 
9.3 
Sense of Agency in OCD: Empirical Data
Several models of OCD highlight a possible disturbance affecting the experience of
control over one’s action or events. For example, Shapiro [41] suggested that compul-
sions in OCD reflect a diminished inner feeling of control (sense of autonomy), lead-
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ing patients to monitor their actions with a conscious effort. OCD individuals consis-
tently self-report experiencing a diminished sense of control in everyday life (i.e.,
self-perception of one’s ability to attain or avoid specific outcomes through one’s
actions) in several studies [42–44]. However, other studies showed that they can
experience a high sense of control [45] or have a higher need for control [46]. These
conflicting results have been interpreted as reflecting the fact that, in response to
their undermined sense of control, some OCD individuals may deploy compulsions
to regain control over their actions or over unwanted events [47, 48]. From this per-
spective, compulsive behaviors can be viewed as a way of artificially inflating affect-
ed individuals’ feelings of control, when the mechanism underlying a “naturally
occurring” sense of control breaks down [49, 50]. 
The experience of control is an important component of the sense of agency,
which depends on how an individual links an action to external outcomes [14]. An
action control mechanism may be crucial for assessing the extent to which one’s
actions produce the desired or expected outcomes; the process that compares the rep-
resentation of expected or desired outcomes to observed outcomes may be the most
important one in this context [12-17]. In everyday actions, people do not conscious-
ly compare “what they intended to do” with “what they actually did”; they only need
to access the results of the unconscious comparison, that is, a matching signal [12,
14]. However, mismatch signals may occur when the automatic action control fails to
guide and monitor an action until goal attainment (which may occur in everyday
behavioral situations in most people from time to time). This, then, causes the auto-
matic control to be passed back to a conscious monitoring of action in order to secure
goal attainment [14, 49]. However, if the conscious control also fails to guide actions
until the desired end-state, then it is more appropriate to abandon conscious monitor-
ing and even to momentarily set aside the pursuit of this goal. A recent theoretical
suggestion posits that, by contrast, OCD individuals are characterized by an inabili-
ty to relax inefficient conscious action monitoring, leading to the deployment of a
range of ways to achieve their goals [49]. To resume, the characteristic feature of
OCD is an abnormally low sense of control that may be compensated through com-
pulsive behaviors, which may have the effect of creating (artificially) a subjective
experience of control. From this perspective, OCD can be reasonably viewed as a dis-
turbance of the experience of the control component of the experience of action. The
studies presented in this section provide a deeper understanding about the potential
defective sense of agency in OCD, through impaired action control mechanisms.
The way in which individuals with OCD symptoms understand the relationship
between their actions and their related outcomes has been examined in the context of
action identification theory [51, 52]. This theory posits that any behavior can be
identified within a cognitive hierarchy of meanings. Higher-level meanings relate to
the desired goal and expected outcomes; lower-level meanings, however, represent
instrumental features and movement parameters. Vallacher and Wegner [51, 52] sug-
gested that the particular level at which an action is identified reflects the particular
representation (movement parameters vs. outcome) on the basis of which the action
is conducted and monitored. Dar and Katz [53] explored the level at which patients
with washing symptoms identified the habitual act of washing their hands, compared
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to non-OCD controls. In their study, the authors used an item related to washing
symptoms (i.e., habitually washing hands). This act was associated with 22 items
varying in their level of abstraction (11 low-level items such as “I run water over my
hands”; 11 high-level items such as “I show responsibility to myself ”). Patients and
non-OCD controls had to indicate their degree of agreement with each item. Their
results suggested that patients conduct their rituals with a representation of goals and
outcomes that are too abstract (e.g., “I clean myself internally,” “I show responsibil-
ity to myself ”) compared to non-OCD controls. Furthermore, this study highlighted
the unusual purpose and outcomes that are related to such a basic action. The authors
suggested that OCD patients’ unusual representation of the act of hand washing is
related to their attempts to control potential harm. Clearly, there is no specific action
plan that allows one to avoid general threatening events and disasters (e.g., prevent-
ing a fire that may destroy the building). In OCD, this fact is compensated by asso-
ciating a basic action with idiopathic cues for safety; compulsions are then deployed
until those cues are encountered (e.g., a specific internal state such as diminished
anxiety); the identification of those cues as outcomes of one’s action may then pro-
vide a feeling (albeit illusory) that one’s actions can control meaningful life events.
Although the way an action is identified depends on several action-related fea-
tures (e.g., action complexity, degree of expertise, action disruption or error), people
tend to adopt a predominant level of action identification across behaviors (i.e., level
of agency [52]). Thus, the level of agency refers to the preferential level at which
actions are generally identified. People with a low level of agency tend to focus on
movement parameters, including sensorimotor consequences of actions, and people
with a high level of agency focus on abstract goals and on the implications of behav-
iors. Belayachi and Van der Linden [54] examined the relationship between OCD
symptoms (i.e., checking and washing symptoms) and the level of agency (i.e., the
preferential level of action identification) in non-clinical participants. In this study,
participants were presented with 23 items, each of which consisted of an everyday
action (e.g., locking a door) followed by two alternatives or “identities.” One was a
low-level depiction of the action (e.g., putting a key in the lock) and the other depict-
ed the action at a high level (e.g., securing the house). Participants had to choose the
alternative that best described each action. The results suggested that checking symp-
toms were related to a general tendency to identify actions mainly in terms of their
procedural aspects and motor components, rather than according to the related out-
comes. This is in agreement with the idea that doubts about the performance and rep-
etition of action (which characterize checking) are related to the focus of “attention
to low-level gestural units of behavior rather than to goal-related higher-level units
that are normally used in action flow parsing” ([55], p. 1). Furthermore, Vallacher
and Wegner [52] showed that focusing on movements during an action, and not on the
goal, might impair action regulation by promoting abnormal “signals of inconsisten-
cy and error,” particularly during routine actions. Overall, this fits with the idea that
OCD symptoms related to incompleteness phenomena (i.e., checking) are connected
with an impaired action monitoring mechanism that may inconsistently generate mis-
match signals or that is not able to generate a matching signal [56]. In addition, the
low level of agency was specifically related to checking symptoms, as compared to
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washing symptoms, which were not related to any particular level of agency. Thus,
the high level of action identification observed in the Dar and Katz study seems to
be specific to patients’ related concerns and compulsions. 
Two studies directly examined the sense of control component of sense of agency
in OCD symptoms. First, Reuven-Magril, Dar, and Lieberman [50] investigated the
potential relationship between the illusory experience of control, compulsive-like
behavior, and OCD symptoms in both non-clinical participants and OCD patients.
They used a preprogrammed sequence of neutral and aversive images for this pur-
pose. In this task, the participants had to attempt to control and shorten the duration
of the image presentation (i.e., desired outcome) by finding the right combination of
key presses (i.e., action). Their perceived level of control was assessed at various
points during the task. Participants did not have any actual control over the duration
of the stimuli. Indeed, the presentation time gradually increased (i.e., increased dis-
crepancy between desired and actual outcomes) throughout the first half of the task
and then gradually decreased for the remaining stimuli (i.e., increased matching
between desired and actual outcomes). The results showed that OCD symptoms in
both clinical and non-clinical populations (regardless of OCD subtype) were related
to more compulsive-like repetitive patterns of action (i.e., using the same key press-
es) and to an increased (illusory) sense of control for aversive and, to a lesser extent,
neutral stimuli. The authors reasonably interpreted their results as consistent with the
idea that compulsions must be viewed as conscious attempts to inflate OCD individ-
uals’ feelings of control over aversive events (i.e., an effortful control). Moreover, the
relationship found between inflated sense of control for neutral stimuli and OCD
symptoms has been related to the high need for control that characterizes some OCD
individuals (i.e., the general motivation of being able to exert control over events).
Furthermore, a higher illusory sense of control in OCD individuals suggests that they
overestimate the extent to which their actions can control events. This is consistent
with the phenomenology observed in cases of exaggerated threat anticipation and
inflated responsibility, expressed as the “belief that one has a pivotal power to bring
about or prevent subjectively crucial negative outcomes” ([23], p. 111). 
In a later study, Belayachi and Van der Linden [57] specifically examined the
mechanism that may be involved in the “naturally occurring” feeling of control over
outcomes that match expectations, in non-clinical participants with OCD symptoms.
The study was based on the assumption that an unconscious comparing mechanism
that grasps a correspondence between expected and actual outcomes underlies the
subjective experience of control (in effortless situations). This mechanism was
explored with a task in which participants were made to feel that they cause an (actu-
ally uncontrollable) outcome, because this outcome was subliminally primed (emu-
lating outcome anticipation) before the participants acted [12]. Subliminal priming
of outcomes is thought to mimic the automatic activation of the representations of
action effects before the action, while simultaneously preventing conscious aware-
ness of these thoughts. In this task (the Wheel of Fortune task), the participant and
the computer each moved a square in opposite directions. The participants’ task was
to press a key (i.e., move) to stop the motion of the squares (i.e., “actual outcome”),
and subsequently to determine whether they or the computer caused the square to
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stop in the observed position (i.e., agency judgment). In reality, the participants had
no control over the movements of the square. The outcome was arranged to not rep-
resent either the participants’ or the computer’s real stop position. In half of the tri-
als, the square position to be presented was primed just before the participants
stopped the motion of the square (i.e., prior thoughts about expected effect). The
results showed that effect priming significantly enhanced feelings of control over the
rapidly moving square, as participants experienced stronger feelings that they caused
the square to stop in the presented position, on primed trials. Under these conditions,
participants with checking symptoms experienced lower feelings of control in both
primed and non-primed trials. This effect was found to be specific to checking, and
not for the other OCD dimensions, and remained when comorbid depression was
controlled for. The authors interpreted those results as being consistent with the
action monitoring dysfunction hypothesis, according to which an inability to gener-
ate a consistent matching signal may lead to incompleteness phenomena. In addition,
this unconscious perception of a match between expected and actual outcomes may
constitute an important cue for goal satisfaction and subsequent action closure in
everyday behaviors [12, 58–60]. Yet, an attenuation of this phenomenal cue may
explain why checking individuals frequently experience incompleteness and doubts
about the goal achievement. Thus, checking compulsions could be behavioral adjust-
ments expressed in order to receive more convincing (explicit) cues about actual goal
completion or to experience completeness (i.e., “just right” feelings). Finally, there
was no association between OCD symptoms and illusory sense of control, in contrast
to the link observed between illusory sense of control and OCD symptoms (regard-
less of OCD subtype) in the Reuven-Magril et al. study[50]. These patterns of results
have been interpreted as confirming the idea that illusion of control in OCD is con-
nected to a conscious effort to obtain such subjective effects (i.e., compulsive-like
behaviors), a situation that was not allowed by the paradigm used in our study. 
9.4 
Summary and Discussion
Two studies have explored the way individuals with the most representative OCD
symptoms (checking and washing symptoms) construe the outcomes of their actions,
by assessing the level of action identification [53, 54]. The results of both studies
suggest that checking symptoms are related to a tendency to identify various com-
mon actions at a low level of action construal (i.e., according to movement parame-
ters rather than goal and outcome aspects [54]). On the other hand, washing individ-
uals were found to identify their highly familiar act of washing hands at a higher
level than non-OCD controls (i.e., a higher level of action identification [53]),
although such an outcome-related identification actually reflected the fact that, com-
pared to non-OCD controls, patients endorsed more magical and unusual outcomes
depicting washers’ concerns (e.g., “I clean myself internally”). This could explain
why washing symptoms were not found to be related to any particularly high level of
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identification for various habitual actions [54]. Although comparably defective
action processing has been observed in both sub-clinical and clinical OCD [11, 33,
61, 62], one could argue that the use of non-clinical participants in the Belayachi and
Van der Linden study and of clinical participants in the Dar and Katz study also
account for the divergent results concerning washing symptoms. 
Although these data are preliminary and must be interpreted with caution, the
patterns of results are rather consistent with the idea that defective outcome process-
ing may be related to OCD, and that it may be differentially affected across OCD sub-
types. Indeed, washing symptoms may be specifically motivated by harm avoidance
[26], while checking symptoms may be particularly related to incompleteness expe-
riences [26, 27]. By extrapolation, the results of the Belayachi and Van der Linden
and Dar and Katz studies could suggest that incompleteness implies a lack of pro-
cessing of actual outcomes generated by actions; harm avoidance, on the other hand,
may be related to inconsistent processing of unrelated events that are misinterpreted
as resulting from one’s actions. Interestingly, the level at which action is identified
may determine the extent to which people experience a feeling of control for out-
comes that match expectations [63].
Consistently, the results of two studies [50, 57] that investigated the sense of con-
trol in persons with OCD symptoms can be interpreted along the same lines.
Participants with OCD symptoms (regardless of OCD subtype) may be characterized
by an increased illusory sense of control in compulsive-like situations (i.e., when
their actions are directed towards effortful attempts to control an event [50]).
However, only individuals with checking proneness appeared to experience an under-
mined sense of control in routine-like situations (i.e., when their actions are sup-
posed to be automatically controlled, rather than under conscious monitoring [57]).
This latter result is consistent with the van der Weiden et al. [63] study in which peo-
ple with a low level of agency were also found to be less prone to experience the illu-
sion in the Wheel of Fortune task. The authors suggested that these results reflect sit-
uations in which people have an intention to generate a specific outcome but lose
track of this intention in the course of action because they did not keep a high-level
representation as they monitored the action at a lower level; consequently, they may
lack experience of control and agency for the intended outcomes they have yet pro-
duced. Overall, a chronic low-level of agency [54] and related undermined sense of
agency [57] in individuals with checking symptoms could explain the repeated enact-
ment of routine actions regardless of the obvious achievement of the goal.
In the study of van der Weiden et al. [63], people with a high level of action iden-
tification were found to be more prone to experience the illusion of control. This is
consistent with the illusion of control in OCD individuals observed in the Reuven-
Magril et al. study, but not with the absence of association between OC symptoms
and an increased experience of control in the Belayachi and Van der Linden study
(i.e., illusion of control, as measured by using the Wheel of Fortune task). It is rather
difficult to compare these studies as the task used in each one differed in terms of the
kind of experience of control it assessed. Indeed, a recent article on the contribution
of sense of control to sense of agency proposed to distinguish between the “sense that
one has to exert control to generate and maintain an appropriate action program” and
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the “sense that one feels in control of an action” ([14, p. 20). Accordingly, the basic
“sense that one feels in control of an action” only requires access to the result of the
unconscious comparisons between predicted and actual states (“effortless control as
for routine or automatic actions” [14]. On the other hand, the importance of mental
and behavioral attempts and the adjustments necessary to reduce the discrepancies
between expectations and outcomes may underlie a distinct form of experience of
control (i.e., “sense that one has to exert control to generate and maintain an appro-
priate action program” as would be the case in disrupted or unfamiliar actions). In
such effortful situations, the conscious effort itself may enhance the impression that
one is engaged in and causing actions. 
In light of this theoretical framework, we could argue that the illusion of control
task used in the Belayachi and Van der Linden study elicited a sense of effortless con-
trol (i.e., predominantly based on automatic and unconscious processes of compari-
son), similar to that observed during non-conscious goal pursuit [12, 13].
Interestingly, no OCD symptoms were found to be correlated with an increased expe-
rience of control; moreover, only the checking symptoms were related to an under-
mined sense of control. This result is in agreement with a recent study in which self-
reported low sense of control was found to be particularly related to checking symp-
toms [48]. In the task used by Reuven-Magril et al. [50], feelings of control were pre-
dominantly elicited by the effortful control situation created by the design of the task.
Overall, this is consistent with a recent theoretical suggestion that compulsions are
conscious attempts to regain control over action when automatic action monitoring
fails to guide actions to the desired outcome (e.g., when the goal is too abstract [49]).
Thus, some empirical evidence seems to confirm Salkovskis’s [23] assumption
that harm avoidance and inflated responsibility might be construed as an illusory
“perception of self-agency” It should be noted that the illusory sense of control
reported by Reuven-Magril et al. [50] may highlight the phenomenon whereby com-
pulsive-like behaviors allow OCD individuals to regain control over unwanted out-
comes (e.g., aversive image) rather than the phenomenon in which they need to con-
trol, and they experience responsibility for anticipated outcomes. Indeed, a key fea-
ture of harm avoidance and responsibility phenomena is the exaggerated anticipation
of negative outcomes and the belief that doing nothing to avoid those outcomes is
similar to causing premeditated harm. 
Interestingly, perceived premeditation may stem from any anticipation-like men-
tal content (such as foresight, effortful forethought, wishful thinking, and the consid-
eration of multiple possible outcomes of action). Therefore, such actions would lead
people to feel responsible for those outcomes and to think that they are under person-
al control [64]. This counterfeit perception of self-responsibility and personal control
may occur despite the obvious irrelevance of premeditation and overt behaviors, and
despite the absence of any causal relationship between premeditation and observed
outcomes [64]. For example, non-clinical participants can experience control and
agency for observed outcomes that match prior conscious thoughts, even when the
causation appears to be magical and when the thought-about outcome is viewed as
undesirable [65]. Thus, future studies should explore the relationship between harm
and responsibility phenomena, and the overestimation of personal influence in the
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occurrence of magical and/or threatening outcomes in a laboratory context.
As for incompleteness, the possible involvement of an impaired unconscious com-
parison mechanism fits with the idea that “not just right” experiences and incomplete-
ness form a fragmented subjective experience resulting from the inability of action
monitoring to generate consistent matching signals [56]. An alternative explanation of
Belayachi and Van der Linden’s [57] results is that checking, which is related to
incompleteness phenomena, is linked to an abnormal access to motor and propriocep-
tive signals, due to low-level action identification (i.e., a predominant focus on sen-
sorimotor features). Those signals are normally filtered and not consciously perceived
[66-68]. Indeed, those signals play a minor role in our experience of action when we
naturally focus on abstract outcome information allowing for goal achievement.
However, a predominant focus on movements (i.e., low level of agency) may lead the
experience of action to be mainly based on proprioceptive information [14, 69]. 
Conversely, it is possible that OCD individuals who feel a sense of incomplete-
ness have an undamaged comparator mechanism, but their ability to interpret match-
ing signals at a cognitive level is impaired [e.g., 59]. This may prevent them from
feeling success when the expected outcome is achieved. It has consistently been
demonstrated that priming knowledge of success alone can increase feelings of con-
trol to the same extent as priming of action effects [70]. Hence, it would be interest-
ing to see whether priming the concept of success increases feelings of completeness
for checking individuals. Future studies should explicitly explore this possibility in
OCD individuals who experience incompleteness phenomena.
9.5 
Conclusion
The symptoms of OCD can be classified according to the extent to which they are
dominated by an increased sense of responsibility for random negative events (i.e.,
harm avoidance) or by peculiar sensory phenomena, preventing one from experienc-
ing a sense of task completion (i.e., incompleteness). Accordingly, OCD individuals
may re-enact certain actions until they obtain an outcome that informs them that they
have achieved control over potential harm or until they integrate the generated out-
come as consistent with the intended one. Overall, the data are consistent with the
assumption that the concerns of OCD individuals regarding harm avoidance and
inflated responsibility are related to an illusory “perception of self-agency” [23].
Those with incompleteness features may be characterized by an undermined sense of
control, in connection with a comparator dysfunction [11, 56]. 
Throughout this chapter, we have tried to demonstrate how OCD can be reason-
ably understood as a disturbance of agency and to point out that the distinct patterns
of the phenomenology of action and underlying mechanisms must be carefully stud-
ied. In both the incompleteness and harm avoidance phenomena, it is the way in which
expected outcomes are compared to observed outcomes that may underlie the
impaired experience of control. However, impaired unconscious comparisons could be
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related to a low feeling of control in incompleteness; in harm avoidance, on the other
hand, dysfunctional beliefs and cognitive-related dysfunctions may account for an
undermined sense of control, which also entails conscious attempts to regain control. 
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